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ABSTRACT 
Scholars have long worried that risk aversion can have significant 
negative effects in the marketplace. In the intellectual property law 
domain, some have worried that risk-averse actors can negatively 
influence the development of important intellectual property law 
doctrines, which can ultimately hamper innovation. For instance, risk-
averse actors may frequently choose to obtain licenses for rights that the 
relevant laws do not actually require of them. When they do so, they 
inadvertently increase the scope of intellectual property rights because 
their risk-averse activities inform courts’ development of key intellectual 
property law doctrines. 
* Professor of Law, BYU Law School. Many thanks to Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Ryan Holte,
Camilla Hrdy, Erika Lietzan, Glynn Lunney, Michael Madison, Liam O’Melinn, Zahr Said, Joshua 
Sarnoff, and Mark Schultz for helpful comments on the ideas in this Article. 
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In this Article, prepared as part of the IP Scholars Forum at Akron 
Law, I look at the other side of the risk coin. In particular, I argue that 
early-stage companies, and sometimes later-stage companies as well, are 
often willing to take on significant intellectual property risks in pursuit of 
commercial opportunities. And by providing courts with opportunities to 
take head-on key intellectual property questions, these risk-taking 
activities, in effect, may often help counterbalance whatever negative 
effects the behavior of risk-averse actors entails. I examine reasons why 
both types of entities are often willing to take on intellectual property 
risks. And I review a number of examples where both early and later-stage 
companies have heavily influenced the development of key intellectual 
property law doctrines by being willing to take their intellectual property 
disputes to court. 
This review, however, highlights several reasons why early-stage 
companies are more dependable risk-taking entities than later-stage 
companies. I thus conclude by briefly assessing two intellectual property-
related means by which to specifically encourage early-stage companies 
to continue to take on intellectual property risks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When commercial actors face uncertain or risky prospects, those 
uncertainties and risks frequently influence how they behave.1 For 
instance, parties lacking enough information to accurately assess their 
chances of success in a given setting (what some scholars define as 
uncertainty) may frequently choose to avoid those uncertain commercial 
waters altogether.2 In other situations, parties may have enough 
information to accurately assess their chances of commercial success. Yet 
because the ultimate outcome remains up in the air (what scholars often 
refer to as risk), parties unable to calm their risk-averse nerves may simply 
steer clear of the opportunity.3 Because both uncertainty and risk are 
relevant to my purposes in this Article, for simplicity I will refer to them 
collectively as risk throughout. 
1. Economist Frank Knight importantly distinguished between what he called risk, where the 
ultimate outcome is unknown but the odds of a given outcome are calculable, and what he called 
uncertainty, where lack of information makes it impossible to calculate the odds of a given outcome. 
See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921); Peter Dizikes, Explained: Knightian 
Uncertainty, MIT NEWS (June 2, 2010), http://news.mit.edu/2010/explained-knightian-0602 
[https://perma.cc/8Y4Q-ASGE]. In this Article, I will generally use the term risk to mean both types 
of situations, though at some points I will distinguish between the two. 
2. Dizikes, supra note 1. 
3. Id. 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/3
2019] RISK TAKING AND RIGHTS BALANCING 875 
Scholars have long worried that risk-aversion can cause parties to act 
in undesirable ways, depriving society of any number of benefits.4 In the 
intellectual property law domain, some have worried that risk-averse 
behavior may actually lead to expansions of intellectual property rights, 
in ways that ultimately hinder innovation.5 
For instance, risk-averse parties may rationally fear that their 
innovative activities will draw the ire of intellectual property owners who 
believe those innovative activities infringe upon their rights.6 In response 
to the prospect of intellectual property owners asserting their rights 
against them, many innovators preemptively seek and obtain intellectual 
property licenses that the relevant intellectual property laws may not 
actually require.7 Or even if some innovative parties were initially willing 
to take on the risks, many of them ultimately decide that licensing the 
rights is the best approach once the relevant intellectual property rights 
owners institute formal legal proceedings against them.8 As more and 
4. The literature in this area is voluminous, and this footnote cannot possibly cover it. For a
sampling, see Francisco Reyes & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Company Law, Lawyers and “Legal” 
Innovation: Common Law Versus Civil Law, 28 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 433, 465 (2013) (discussing 
how risk aversion can lead lawyers to avoid innovative new contractual means of addressing legal 
issues); Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 298, 306 (1999) 
(discussing how risk aversion may affect employees’ choices relating to job opportunities); MICHAEL 
E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 528–29 (1990) (discussing how risk 
aversion may lead to a “slowing of true strategic innovation.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? 
Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 
1371, 1374 (2002) (noting that over “the last two decades, much thought has been devoted to finding 
ways to direct the attention of boards and directors away from a safe managerialist perspective 
focusing on entity preservation, and toward a more entrepreneurial, risk-taking, and competitive-
enhancing attitude.”); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2531 (1994) (“[P]atents help to overcome the high risk-aversion associated 
with the prospecting function of developing markets for major new discoveries.”); Kenneth Arrow, 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 610–14 (Nat’l Bureau for Econ. et al. eds., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1962) (suggesting that risk aversion can stifle innovation); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination 
of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1995) (arguing that certain factors 
in the Japanese and German corporate environments lead to risk aversion and thereby less innovation). 
5. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 882 (2007). 
6. For an example of why parties may fear intellectual property issues, see Adam C. Uzialko, 
Copyright Infringement: Are You Stealing Intellectual Property?, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/6043-intellectual-property-tips.html [https://perma.cc/LMR3-
7QNJ]. 
7. Gibson, supra note 5. 
8. For a discussion of this type of behavior in the patent context, see Mark A. Lemley & A.
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013) (discussing 
how some types of patent trolls are able to extract rents from practicing entities in part because of the 
high costs of litigation). 
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more innovators go these rational but risk-averse routes, courts may 
increasingly interpret intellectual property laws expansively because they 
deem that this pattern of license-seeking reflects a common understanding 
that such licenses are necessary for the types of activities that the 
innovators pursue.9 The result is that, over time, intellectual property 
rights grow.10 And as they grow, follow-on innovators have less leeway 
to pursue their innovative activities.11 Furthermore, the growing 
constriction of their freedoms pushes innovators into the same risk-
averting behaviors of their predecessors.12 Ultimately, this negative 
feedback loop causes courts to morph intellectual property laws into 
something those laws were never meant to be, making innovation more 
expensive and, in some cases, impossible.13 
Recent research has partially countered some of these concerns.14 
For instance, creative parties may actually typically be risk seekers, not 
risk averters.15 This could mean that even if some risk-averse innovators 
contribute to the above-discussed negative feedback loop, risk-seeking 
innovators at times provide a counterweight to whatever distortive effects 
risk-averting parties’ behavior may have. Some of the concerns about lost 
innovation and intellectual property doctrines gone amok may thus be 
overstated, even if in certain respects valid. 
This Article contributes to this discussion by examining two 
scenarios in which greater risk-taking is more likely, and which thus may 
provide some comfort to those that worry about the negative effects of all-
too-prevalent risk aversion. First, early-stage companies are often ardent 
risk takers.16 The very purpose behind many start-up companies is to 
pursue some novel, innovative idea in the marketplace and ultimately reap 
the rewards therefrom.17 Thus, early-stage companies often have a greater 





14. See, e.g., Vaibhav Tyagi et al., The Risky Side of Creativity: Domain Specific Taking in
Creative Individuals, 8 FRONT PSYCH. 145 (2017) (providing an overview of some of this research 
and finding a correlation between social risk-taking and certain levels of a person’s creativity). 
15. See, e.g., Andres Sawicki, Risky IP, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81 (2016) (arguing, based on
reviewing a significant amount of creativity research, that creative parties are typically risk seekers 
and thus are more likely than not to embrace intellectual property risks in their creative endeavors). 
16. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk
of Entrepreneurship, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1163 (2010) (discussing the financial risks that 
entrepreneurs often take in pursuit of greater returns).  
17. For this reason, “[n]ovel startup companies often face not only risk, but also unforeseeable 
uncertainty (the inability to recognize and articulate all relevant variables affecting performance).” 
4
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appetite for risk than is typical, and they are often committed to seeing 
those risks through.18 
This is certainly not to say that start-ups don’t face significant risks 
in uncertain environments,19 or that they are impervious to those risks in 
deciding whether to continue their entrepreneurial pursuits.20 After all, 
most fail due to the constant struggle to amass sufficient resources, 
making start-up life one of constant peril.21 And it is certainly true that not 
all start-up companies are risk takers.22 Yet among early-stage companies, 
the will to take on significant risks in hopes of eventually overcoming 
them is prevalent enough, as the ongoing formation of start-up companies 
attest.23 Indeed, though in an absolute sense entrepreneurs may not 
actually prefer risk any more than the next person, research suggests that 
many entrepreneurs perceive less risk in situations than others due to a 
number of cognitive biases that they frequently exhibit.24 Early-stage 
companies’ willingness to test uncharted waters thus provide one 
significant counterweight to occurrences of risk aversion, and that risk-
Svenja C. Sommer et al., Managing Complexity and Unforeseeable Uncertainty in Startup 
Companies: An Empirical Study, 20 ORG. SCI. 118, 129 (2009). 
18. Akira Hirai, What Kills Startups?, CAYENNE CONSULTING, 
https://www.caycon.com/what-kills-startups [https://perma.cc/7L2Z-69BA] (“Entrepreneurs are, by 
definition, risk takers.”). 
19. Sommer et al., supra note 17 (discussing some of the types of risks and uncertainty that
startup companies face). 
20. See, e.g., Marco van Gelderen et al., Success and Risk Factors in the Pre-Startup Phase, 
24 SMALL BUS. ECON. 365 (2005) (presenting empirical results suggesting that entrepreneurs who 
perceive their venture to entail significant risk are more likely to fail than those perceiving their 
ventures to be less risky). 
21. See, e.g., Neil Patel, 90% of Startups Fail: Here’s What You Need to Know About the 10%, 
FORBES (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilpatel/2015/01/16/90-of-startups-will-fail-
heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-10/#11982dfe6679 [https://perma.cc/LF9Y-PFXK]. 
22. Trevor Clawson, The Corporate Hunt for Startup Innovation Continues But Risk Aversion 
Gets in the Way, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/trevorclawson/2018/12/31/the-corporate-hunt-for-startup-innovation-continues-but-risk-
aversion-gets-in-the-way/#631ffe684a92 [https://perma.cc/2EQT-GMCN] (discussing how growing 
economic uncertainty is causing many startup companies to increasingly avoid risk). 
23. See, e.g., Bloomberg U.S. Startup Barometer, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/startup-barometer/ [https://perma.cc/SWD3-PENZ] (showing 
the growth of startup companies in the U.S. since 2007). But see Ben Casselman, Risk-Averse Culture 
Infects U.S. Workers, Entrepreneurs, WALL. ST. J. (June 2, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324031404578481162903760052 
[https://perma.cc/JB5A-767M] (discussing an overall decline in U.S. entrepreneurship as companies 
and people grow more risk-averse in response to a number of factors).  
24. See, e.g., Mark Simon, Cognitive Biases, Risk Perception, and Venture Formation: How
Individuals Decide to Start Companies, 15 J. BUS. VENTURING 113 (2000) (discussing how certain 
cognitive biases, such as overconfidence, illusions of control, and belief in the law of small numbers, 
lead many entrepreneurs to perceive less risk than the average person). 
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taking has important implications for how intellectual property laws 
develop, as this Article will explore. 
Second, even larger, later-stage incumbents, known for their 
lumbering, risk-averse ways,25 sometimes also take on significant risks 
because the benefits of certain innovation routes appear to outweigh the 
costs of those same routes, including by way of intellectual property rights 
assertions.26 Admittedly, later-stage companies almost certainly avoid 
risk more frequently than their early-stage counterparts.27 In part, this is 
because later-stage companies simply face a different, in some cases more 
expansive, set of risks than early stage companies.28 Yet when they do 
throw caution to the wind, later-stage companies’ risk-seeking exploits 
can also significantly help shape intellectual property laws, as this Article 
will further explore below. 
This Article first briefly assesses how others have examined the 
prevalence and effects of risk in the intellectual property domain. It then 
turns to examining how the maturity of companies often affects their 
approaches to risk, with early-stage companies frequently being greater 
risk-takers than their later-stage counterparts. Despite this, later-stage 
companies also sometimes have reason to take on risk when the benefits 
of doing so outweigh the perceived costs. Hence, despite the prevalence 
of risk aversion, risk-seeking is also prevalent in certain circumstances, 
and that activity can have important balancing effects on how intellectual 
property law doctrines develop. Finally, I assess some of the more 
important implications of my analysis. In particular, I argue that because 
of their risk-taking tendencies, ensuring that early-stage companies 
25. See Tim Koller, Overcoming a Bias Against Risk, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2012),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-
insights/overcoming-a-bias-against-risk [https://perma.cc/H7KK-3PB5] (discussing how CEOs at 
large companies are often more risk-averse than overconfident). 
26. See, e.g., John Rampton, Businesses That Took Huge Risks That Paid Off, INC. (Oct. 11,
2016), https://www.inc.com/john-rampton/15-businesses-that-took-huge-risks-that-paid-off.html 
[https://perma.cc/J8PG-B4ZK] (discussing several large companies that took on significant risks in 
pursuit of commercial opportunities, including Microsoft and Google). 
27. For reasons why this may be so, see George Deeb, The 5 Reasons Big Companies Struggle 
With Innovation, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgedeeb/2014/01/08/the-
five-reasons-big-companies-struggle-with-innovation/#693045aa2958 [https://perma.cc/65EZ-
P6ZW] (discussing as one reason why big companies avoid innovative new paths is because so much 
consensus-building must occur).  
28. See, e.g., Robert W. Vossen, Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of Small Firms in
Innovation, 16 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 88 (1998) (pointing to research indicating that one of the 
weaknesses of large firms is that they are often plagued with bureaucracy and thus have a more 
difficult time reacting to changing market conditions, thus posing the risk that they will miss out on 
significant opportunities). 
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continue to thrive is vital to the overall development and efficacy of our 
intellectual property laws. 
II. RISK AND ITS EFFECTS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
As mentioned above, the literature surrounding risk and its possible 
effects on innovation is voluminous. This Article focuses on a narrower 
piece of the risk puzzle: what is the effect of risk on intellectual property 
doctrines? This question is relevant to the broader question of how risk 
affects innovation because intellectual property laws, depending on how 
they are structured, can arguably affect the pace and direction of 
innovation either positively or negatively.29 Hence, rather than directly 
grappling with the broader issue of risk and innovation, I confine myself 
to how risk and the behavior it influences may affect the development of 
certain intellectual property law doctrines. 
I use Professor James Gibson’s influential 2007 Yale Law Journal 
article as a jumping off point for this discussion.30 In the article, Gibson 
gives a persuasive account of how rational parties facing intellectual 
property risks often engage in licensing practices that ultimately expand a 
number of key intellectual property doctrines.31 Those expansions, in turn, 
may eventually hinder innovative activities.32 
To illustrate: suppose a filmmaker wishes to incorporate some 
copyrighted work within a documentary they are making, but they fear 
doing so without first obtaining permission from the copyright owner. 
This is so despite the reality that a number of copyright limitations, 
including the fair use and de minimis defenses, may actually permit them 
to include the copyrighted work within their film without obtaining 
permission.33 However, these limitations are ex post court determinations, 
meaning that the filmmaker would need to litigate the matter to know for 
sure whether their use of the copyrighted work required permission.34 
29. See, e.g., Jason Wiens & Chris Jackson, How Intellectual Property Can Help or Hinder
Innovation, KAUFFMAN FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.kauffman.org/what-we-
do/resources/entrepreneurship-policy-digest/how-intellectual-property-can-help-or-hinder-
innovation [https://perma.cc/TH63-4FF9] (discussing this reality). 
30. Gibson, supra note 5. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. For a discussion of both the fair use and de minimis defenses, see Measuring Fair Use:
The Four Factors, STAN. UNIV. LIBR., https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-
factors/#too_small_for_fair- _use_the_de_minimis defense [https://perma.cc/V3N8-Z649]. 
34. As Larry Lessig has famously said, fair use is no more “than a right to hire a lawyer.”
Stephen Manes, Let’s Have Less of Lessig, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2004), 
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The copyright owner, after all, may object to their use, and sue the 
filmmaker on the basis of it. If that scenario were to unfold, the filmmaker 
may have to pay tens of thousands of dollars—and probably even more—
in defending their use in court.35 Furthermore, they may incur all of that 
time and money defending their use for naught; a court may ultimately 
agree with the copyright owner that the filmmaker needed the copyright 
owner’s permission to use the work in their film.36 In order to avoid all of 
these risks and uncertainties, the filmmakers may rationally choose to 
negotiate and obtain permission from the copyright owner—typically in 
the form of a paid license—to use the copyrighted work. 
While this single example may seem rather benign, Gibson argues 
that many rational, risk-averse parties regularly undertake similar 
behavior.37 Consequently, in the aggregate, this type of behavior is 
possibly quite pervasive.38 And the pervasiveness of that behavior can, 
over time, expand the scope of intellectual property entitlements in ways 
that ultimately harm the direction and pace of innovation. 
For example, one of the most important factors under copyright’s fair 
use defense is the use’s effect on the potential market for, or value of, the 
copyrighted work.39 In assessing this factor, courts often look to the 
existence of licensing markets in determining whether a particular use 
negatively affects a copyright owner’s market for the work.40 If parties 
regularly pay license fees for particular uses of copyrighted works, it is 
more likely that a court will deem that a market for the work exists and 
that an unlicensed use negatively affects the work’s market.41 Hence, to 
the extent that many risk-averse parties act similarly to the filmmaker 
described above in a variety of copyright markets, the result is that courts 
assessing fair use questions will frequently be confronted with pervasive 
https://www.forbes.com/2004/04/02/cz_sm_0402manes.html#29723d0d3663 
[https://perma.cc/466Z-34U3] (critiquing this argument). 
35. See, e.g., Keli Johnson Swan, United States: The True Cost of Defending Against Copyright 
Infringement Litigation, MONDAQ (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/x/421188/Copyright/The+True+Cost+Of+Defending+Against+Copyright+Infringemen
t+Litigation [https://perma.cc/3ZMH-3CZH] (suggesting that defending against claims of copyright 
infringement typically cost parties “several thousand dollars per month.”). 
36. Indeed, one of the most frequent complaints about the fair use defense is its supposed
unpredictability. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 66 (2008) (arguing that 
the defense’s open-endedness makes predicting a fair use outcome difficult). 
37. Gibson, supra note 5. 
38. Id. 
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2018). 
40. See, e.g., Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145 (2000) (critiquing when courts do 
so, among other things). 
41. Id. 
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licensing activities that suggest negative market impacts for unlicensed 
uses. In other words, risk-aversion leading to widespread licensing means 
that a finding of fair use becomes a less likely outcome in future cases. 
But that outcome is not necessarily rational from a law and policy 
standpoint, even if it was rational for many risk-averse parties to seek out 
licenses. 
In Gibson’s narrative, then, widespread risk-aversion creates a 
negative feedback loop. Parties rationally avoid risk by taking licenses for 
uses of works that the law may not actually require of them. And as more 
and more parties engage in this type of behavior, the law eventually 
changes in response to the pervasive risk-averting behavior. The change 
comes in the form of rights expansion. After all, if the scope of copyright’s 
fair use defense shrinks in response to courts taking into account pervasive 
licensing markets, that means that copyright owners are more likely to win 
their cases against those relying on such a defense in the future. And over 
time, as intellectual property rights continue to expand in response to 
pervasive risk-aversion, that expansion only makes additional, ever-
growing risk-aversion more likely. 
The ultimate result may be less innovation and creativity overall. 
Limitations on intellectual property entitlements are often grounded in a 
belief that those limits are necessary to strike a healthy balance between 
incentivizing rights holders on the one hand and allowing for follow-on 
creators to use preexisting materials in their own creative efforts on the 
other.42 Hence, if that balance tilts too much in favor of rights holders, we 
may stunt much of the beneficial follow-on creativity that we seek to 
foster with limits on intellectual property rights.43 
Despite these bleak possibilities, creativity and innovation have 
continued apace since Gibson wrote his article. Indeed, by some metrics, 
innovation has expanded rapidly in the past decade since his article’s 
publication.44 Is that innovation happening in spite of intellectual property 
42. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1389 (2012) (describing the purpose of copyright law’s fair use 
limitation on copyright rights as helping “balanc[e] incentives to create original works with the social 
benefits that flow from the broad dissemination of those works, and by preserving fundamental First 
Amendment rights and free expression.”). 
43. Stefan Bechtold et al., Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in
Intellectual Property, 91 IND. L.J. 1251, 1257 (2016) (suggesting that copyright’s fair use doctrines 
helps limit rights such that follow-on creators have some space for creativity). 
44. See, e.g., Alison Berman & Jason Dorrier, Technology Feels Like It’s Accelerating – 
Because It Actually Is, SINGULARITYHUB (Mar. 22, 2016), https://singularityhub.com/
2016/03/22/technology-feels-like-its-accelerating-because-it-actually-is/ [https://perma.cc/778P-
ZY6U] (reviewing RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND 
BIOLOGY (2005)). 
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entitlements experiencing slow, steady accretion? Perhaps we would have 
even greater levels of innovation and creativity but for the constant 
expansion of intellectual property rights? Taking a step back, are courts 
actually expanding intellectual property entitlements over time?45 At best, 
it seems to be a mixed bag.46 Even more provocatively, do intellectual 
property entitlements actually affect the pace and direction of innovation 
all that much, regardless of whether they are expanding or shrinking?47 
Or perhaps Gibson’s account is simply incomplete? It is certainly 
true that many parties rationally act in the way that he suggests. Anecdotes 
of this type of behavior abound.48 It is also certainly the case that many 
courts take their risk-inspired activities into account in deciding whether 
a variety of intellectual property rights limitations should apply. 
Yet other parties are not so risk-averse as the rational actors upon 
which Gibson focuses. Indeed, certain parties are more typically risk 
seekers. Or, in other cases, parties simply deem risks that they would 
normally shun to be worth it. The next part identifies and discusses two 
important classes of risk seekers: early-stage companies and, in some 
cases, later-stage companies. Overall, while risk aversion may be 
prevalent enough to affect intellectual property entitlements, risk seekers 
may often help balance out the behavior of risk averters, thereby helping 
preserve the balances that intellectual property laws seek to achieve. 
III. THE RISK TAKERS
Some recent research suggests that creative parties in particular 
frequently have an appetite for risk. Professor Andres Sawicki, for 
instance, points to a body of creativity research in arguing that creative 
types may typically be greater risk takers than their less creative 
45. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem With Intellectual Property Rights: Subject
Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH 36 (2010–2011) (discussing how the subject matter of 
intellectual property rights has expanded over time). 
46. See, e.g., Russell Slifer, Weakened Patent System Causes U.S. to Slip as a Global Leader
of IP Protection, THE HILL (Aug. 4, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/345370-
weakened-patent-system-causes-us-to-slip-as-a-global-leader-of [https://perma.cc/M3QK-UCSS] 
(arguing that the U.S. patent system has weakened); George Ford, Putting “Fair” Back in “Fair 
Use”, FED. SOC’Y (June 26, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/putting-fair-back-in-
fair-use [https://perma.cc/HCE6-ELPV] (making an increasingly common argument that the fair use 
doctrine has expanded beyond what is productive). 
47. For an argument in this direction relating to patenting standards, see Mark A. Lemley, The 
Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
48. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 891 (2012) (discussing how in the wake of courts finding peer-to-peer file sharing systems to 
infringe copyright owners’ rights, many subsequent innovators and investors shunned the 
technological field altogether).  
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counterparts.49 As a result, they may not only more willingly take on 
greater risks in pursuit of their creative activities, but they may also prefer 
the riskier nature of intellectual property entitlements to more certain 
rewards such as salaries and grants.50 Hence, while many rational actors 
facing intellectual property risks may shun them in favor of a safer 
approach, innovative parties at times embrace those risks, whether 
rationally or irrationally, in pursuit of some creative enterprise and the 
greater opportunities associated therewith. Or in other cases, they may 
simply be ignorant of the risks, allowing them (at least for a time) to 
blissfully pursue commercial opportunities largely unaware of the circling 
sharks. The following sections explore two settings where creative parties 
may often take on, rather than shun, significant intellectual property risks. 
A. Early-Stage Companies 
One important group of risk takers is early-stage companies. Early-
stage companies may take on risk more frequently than others for a 
number of reasons. One is that for many early-stage companies, risk is 
part of their identity.51 The very reason many parties found start-up 
companies, after all, is to venture into some uncharted territory in pursuit 
of greater economic returns.52 Hence, while risk may certainly affect how 
they go about pursuing those returns, including by way of efforts to reduce 
the risks, for entrepreneurs risk-taking is, in some sense, “part of the 
game.”53 
This risk-taking may often be rational, in the sense that the founders 
have taken into account the risks, calculated their chances of success, and 
49. Sawicki, supra note 15. 
50. Id. 
51. See Sari Pekkala Kerr et al., Personality Traits of Entrepreneurs: A Review of Recent
Literature 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 18-047, 2017) (discussing attitudes towards risk as 
one possible means of identifying entrepreneurs, though suggesting that the literature on this topic is 
far from conclusive). 
52. Craig Bloem, Starting a Business Is Risky. Here’s How to Determine if That Risk
Outweighs the Reward, INC. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.inc.com/craig-bloem/starting-a-business-
is-risky-heres-how-to-determine-if-that-risk-outweighs-reward.html [https://perma.cc/A464-8N2X] 
(discussing research showing that successful startup founders were often those willing to take on 
“tremendous uncertainty” in pursuit of significant economic rewards). 
53. Paul B. Brown, Why Entrepreneurs Are the Most Risk-Averse People on the Planet, INC. 
(May 28, 2014), https://www.inc.com/paul-brown/entrepreneurs-most-risk-averse-people-on-the-
planet.html [https://perma.cc/UKQ4-5PN2] (arguing that entrepreneurs are actually typically risk-
averse in the sense that they work extremely hard to minimize risk, all the while accepting risk “as 
part of the game.”). 
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chosen to roll the dice.54 Or it may often be irrational, in the sense that the 
company’s founders lack sufficient information to accurately assess their 
chances of success, but choose to proceed anyway.55 Either way, their 
entrepreneurial outlook is a key factor pushing them to make the bet. 
In fact, in many cases start-up companies may be willing to take on 
more risk than others because their founders simply don’t always 
accurately recognize the risks that they face.56 This inability to see or 
appreciate risks may simply be part of the entrepreneurial personality.57 
For instance, some evidence suggests that start-up founders perceive less 
risk than is typical due to cognitive biases relating to overconfidence, 
illusions of control, and beliefs in the law of small numbers.58 Hence, it 
may not always be the case that, subjectively, entrepreneurial types are 
greater risk takers than others. But objectively, they may often take on 
greater risks than others because cognitive biases inhibit their ability to 
accurately assess their chances of success. Hence, those biases may often 
propel them forward in pursuit of their commercial goals, regardless of 
whether doing so is rational or not. 
In other cases, early-stage companies are able to stomach the relevant 
risks because there simply isn’t much risk to swallow. Put differently, 
many early-stage companies’ limited resources and market exposure 
make them less of a target to intellectual property owners (at least early 
on). For instance, intellectual property owners may often find it makes 
little economic sense to sue early stage companies because, at that early 
stage of market entry, so little money is in play.59 In many cases, it is only 
later, when the stakes are higher, that litigation makes economic sense. Of 
course, this is not always true—sometimes suing a start-up may be the 
54. For a discussion of how law firms and venture capitalists often help startup companies
mediate such risks, see Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital 
Funds as Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (1994) (Ph.D. thesis, 
Stanford University) (on file with Stanford Law Libraries, University of Stanford). 
55. See KNIGHT, supra note 1. 
56. L.E. Palich & D.R. Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain Entrepreneurial Risk-
Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING 425 (1995). 
57. James Carland III et al., Risk Taking Propensity Among Entrepreneurs, Small Business
Owners and Managers, 7 J. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 15 (1995) (finding that entrepreneurs are 
more likely than others to take on risk). 
58. See SIMON C. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 185–86 (2018)
(discussing psychology literature providing reasons why entrepreneurs may be particularly subject to 
overconfidence biases); Simon, supra note 24 (discussing some of the same biases). 
59. See Tim Molino, If Your Startup Really Is Disruptive, Expect to Be Sued by a Patent Troll, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/296625 
[https://perma.cc/ZVF9-46TR] (discussing how disruptive startups are often the targets of lawsuits, 
with the implication being that other startups may often be less clear targets). 
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best option for stopping the competition in its tracks.60 And owners of 
intellectual property who don’t practice their rights, but sue others that 
do—often referred to as trolls—frequently target start-ups for a quick 
buck.61 Nevertheless, for many intellectual property owners suing start-
ups simply makes little economic sense, so that start-ups in some (though 
certainly not all) respects simply face fewer intellectual property risks. 
Finally, start-ups may often take on more risks than others because 
their founders are ignorant of the risks that they face. This ignorance is 
different than the biases discussed above; in these scenarios, early-stage 
companies may take on risks simply because they don’t perceive them, 
not because their biases lead them to underestimate or dismiss those risks. 
One common reason for such ignorance is that start-up companies often 
have less access to lawyers and others whose job it is to identify those 
risks for them.62 Lacking that sophistication, many start-ups thus stumble 
their way through commercial terrain fraught with plausible perils, but 
which they simply don’t see. And in many cases, the doomsday scenarios 
that lawyers are adept at articulating simply don’t materialize, meaning 
that the start-up company is able to forge ahead in blissful ignorance of 
the hazards they never saw. In the end, it may have been rational or 
irrational to take on the risks that they did. Either way, they have their 
ignorance to thank (or blame). 
Of course, these generalities certainly don’t apply to all early-stage 
companies. Not all start-ups take on significant risks, and not all 
entrepreneurs experience the same cognitive biases in favor of risk-
taking.63 Some, in fact, have biases pushing them away from risk.64 
Indeed, the culture of risk taking that I have described in this section may 
mostly apply to a particular breed of start-up—the Silicon Valley start-
60. Id. 
61. Nathaniel Borenstein, More Patent Trolls Are Targeting Startups. Here’s What You Can
Do, ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/310648 
[https://perma.cc/9JU7-PLMC]. 
62. Anne Fisher, Starting a Company? Don’t Hire a Cheap Lawyer, FORTUNE (May 23, 2016), 
https://fortune.com/2016/05/23/starting-a-company-dont-hire-a-cheap-lawyer/ [https://
perma.cc/2CFR-ZXMV] (“[M]any company founders think they don’t need a lawyer at all.”). 
63. Ju-min Park & Hyunjoo Jin, No Uber or Airbnb in South Korea – Red Tape, Risk-Aversion 
Hobble Start-Ups, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-southkorea-startups-
insight/no-uber-or-airbnb-in-south-korea-red-tape-risk-aversion-hobble-start-ups-
idUKKBN1OG2GV [https://perma.cc/MQ2D-P4LT]. 
64. See, e.g., Gennaro Bernile, What Doesn’t Kill You Will Only Make You More Risk-Loving: 
Early-Life Disasters and CEO Behavior, 72 J. FIN. 167 (2017) (discussing research showing that 
CEOs who experienced the extreme downsides of early-life disasters were more reluctant to take on 
risks than CEOs who had experienced traumatic events without extremely negative consequences). 
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up—whereas start-ups from other regions may frequently exhibit quite 
different behaviors.65 
Furthermore, according to a growing body of research, the start-up 
world has become increasingly more risk-averse, as an uncertain 
economic environment pushes venture capitalists and other funders to 
mostly place safe bets where high returns in relatively short order are more 
likely.66 That kind of straightjacket can certainly push start-up companies 
out of uncertain endeavors into less risky waters.67 And as investors 
exercise ever greater control over their funded companies, they are more 
likely to discipline the companies so as to avoid significant risks, 
including those relating to intellectual property rights.68 
But investor demands for significant returns can also push companies 
to seek out ever greater risks in hopes of hitting the jackpot.69 “No risk, 
no reward” may sound trite, but it is a common motif in the start-up world 
for a reason.70 Furthermore, it is also simply the case that many start-ups 
lack traditional forms of investor backing, and thus some of the 
65. For a discussion of how law firms and venture capitalists often help Northern California
startups navigate and overcome a variety of risks, see Mark. C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired 
Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 679 (1996). 
66. See generally Julius Krein, Taking Stock of Venture Capital, AM. CONSERVATIVE (May 
27, 2019), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/taking-stock-of-venture-capital/ 
[https://perma.cc/3U5Q-LXPT] (reviewing recent research showing that venture capitalists tend to 
invest conservatively and in certain sectors that more readily allow for quick, large returns); Erin 
Griffith, More Start-Ups have an Unfamiliar Message for Venture Capitalists: Get Lost, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/technology/start-ups-rejecting-venture-
capital.html [https://perma.cc/EB5J-3Y4J] (discussing a recent phenomenon where startups are more 
frequently declining venture capital because their pressures to grow faster than is healthy can 
effectively kill the startup’s business in the long run).  
67. Brendan Coffey, Venture Capitalists Become Risk Averse, FORTUNE (Oct. 20, 2011),
https://fortune.com/2011/10/20/venture-capitalists-become-risk-averse/ [https://perma.cc/58PQ-
Y5Q5] (discussing the trend of venture capitalists increasingly investing in less risky ventures). 
68. See, e.g., Richard Harroch, A Guide to Venture Capital Financings for Startups, FORBES 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2018/03/29/a-guide-to-venture-capital-
financings-for-startups/#41476f9951c9 [https://perma.cc/XY7K-CWZU] (discussing some of the 
types of controls over funded companies venture capitalists often seek). 
69. See Ranjay Gulati & Alicia DeSantola, Start-Ups That Last, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/03/start-ups-that-last [https://perma.cc/L5YH-MTRZ] (discussing how many 
startups have difficulty growing as quickly as funders demand because they fail to successfully scale 
their businesses, which can include seeking “different avenues for growth,” including “developing 
new products or services, entering new markets, or engaging in other forms of innovation.”). 
70. Martin Zwilling, 10 Calculated Risks That Lead to Startup Success, FORBES (Aug. 27,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2014/08/27/10-startup-calculated-risks-that-
lead-to-success/#128149e870fc [https://perma.cc/FC3V-MSM7] (discussing this perception in the 
startup world). 
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concomitant control (and identification of risk) as well.71 While this may 
mean that they have fewer resources at their disposal (and thus face 
significant risks of failing for want of funds), it also means that they have 
greater liberty to take on risks, including intellectual property risks, in 
charting their own rational, irrational, or ignorant paths. 
B. Early-Stage Companies’ Effects on IP Law 
Examining intellectual property case law provides evidence in 
support of the argument that early-stage companies are often willing to 
take on significant intellectual property related risks in pursuit of 
commercial opportunities. Indeed, intellectual property case law is littered 
with examples of early-stage companies taking on significant intellectual 
property risks in pursuit of innovation.72 And as these early-stage 
companies have pursued innovation and thrown caution to the wind, they 
have helped define important intellectual property law doctrines. 
Of course, these cases are anecdotal and don’t represent a scientific 
sampling that proves the point that early-stage companies are more willing 
than others to take on intellectual property risks. But they do provide some 
substantiation of the intuitions discussed above as to why early-stage 
companies may frequently take on risks in pursuit of commercial 
opportunities. 
One example of this dynamic lies in the innovative efforts of many 
early-stage companies in shaping the contours of copyright law’s fair use 
defense. Fair use is copyright law’s most important defense to claims of 
copyright infringement; largely based on a four-factor statutory test, it 
provides courts with leeway to allow an otherwise infringing use that they 
deem encourages, rather than discourages, overall creative activity.73 For 
instance, if someone parodies a copyrighted work, and that parody makes 
use of copyrighted expression from the work, a judge may allow use of 
that expression on the basis of fair use.74 Or if some technology provider’s 
device enables innovative uses of copyrighted works, a court may deem 
71. See, e.g., Cherly Contee, Advice on Launching a Tech Startup When You’re Not a White
Man, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/advice-on-launching-a-tech-startup-
when-youre-not-a-white-man [https://perma.cc/WNQ2-4HPD] (discussing different strategies for 
obtaining non-traditional investor backing when entrepreneurs come from non-traditional 
backgrounds). 
72. For an overview of some of this case law as it relates to search engines, see Urs Gasser,
Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201 (2006). 
73. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 495 (6th ed. 2014) (indicating 
that fair use is “by far the most important defense to an action for copyright infringement.”). 
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (suggesting that a
parody of Roy Orbison’s song, “Pretty Woman,” constitutes a fair use). 
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those innovative uses to be fair largely because they do not harm the 
copyrighted works’ market.75 
The fair use doctrine is also one of the focal points of Gibson’s 
analysis. In his article, he argues that the licensing behaviors of risk-
averse parties may heavily influence courts’ assessments of factor four of 
the fair use inquiry. This factor, traditionally one of the most important 
components of the fair use test, looks to a use’s impact on the copyrighted 
work’s market.76 Gibson argues that risk-averse parties regularly taking 
unnecessary licenses means that, over time, factor four will more 
frequently weigh in favor of copyright owners. Hence, the scope of fair 
use will gradually shrink because the licensing behavior of risk-averse 
parties means that courts will view the failure to take a license as 
negatively impacting copyright owners’ markets. 
Yet despite this prediction, early-stage companies have regularly 
defended their innovative uses of copyrighted materials as fair uses—and 
in some cases won—thereby helping push fair use into new territory. One 
clear example relates to the early history of the Internet search engine 
industry. Start-up search engine companies faced an early crisis when 
copyright owners claimed that those search engines, by copying and 
displaying portions of their copyrighted works in response to search 
queries, infringed their copyright rights.77 Several important innovators in 
the search space, including a younger Google, thus faced the possibility 
of significant liability by pursuing their innovative activities. The risks 
were immense, but the rewards were too. 
Hence, rather than caving to the copyright owners’ demands, early 
search engine companies fought back. One of these, Arriba Soft 
Corporation, defended its product in response to a commercial 
photographer suing it for copyright infringement, claiming that its uses of 
the copyrighted materials as part of search results constituted a fair use of 
them.78 The district court sided with Arriba, finding that both the 
company’s display of thumbnail versions of the photos and its in-line and 
75. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding time-shifting 
copyrighted works using VCRs to constitute a fair use).  
76. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (finding that factor four outcomes strongly correlate with overall 
fair use outcomes, though noting that factor four seems to largely function as a space where courts 
summarize their discussions of the other factors). 
77. For some background on these cases and their outcomes, see Robin Jeweler & Brian Yeh, 
Internet Search Engines: Copyright’s “Fair Use” in Reproduction and Public Display Rights, CONG. 
RES. SERV. (Jan 28, 2008), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
files/20080128_RL33810_96be5282f0051cf8635f644cb7df46880c65b571.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KWS3-4HVG]. 
78. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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framing links to the full-sized versions constituted fair use.79 The 
photographer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
(Ninth Circuit), which also sided with Arriba on the thumbnail issue.80 On 
the in-line linking and framing of the full-sized photos issue, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the court should not have 
decided the issue because the parties had not adequately raised it.81 Hence, 
though outstanding issues remained, Arriba’s risky pushback against the 
claims of copyright owners helped begin to shape the fair use doctrine’s 
application to an increasingly important technological field. 
Soon thereafter, the activities of another early-stage Internet search 
company, Google, would help resolve some of these outstanding 
questions. Based upon an early iteration of its search engine service, 
Google began receiving cease and desist letters from copyright owners as 
early as 2001, well before the company went public in 2004.82 Again, 
copyright owners claimed that Google’s search results infringed their 
copyright rights in a number of ways. But like Arriba, Google took on the 
associated intellectual property risks by fighting back against these 
claims. 
In one case, filed months before Google went public, the copyright 
holder claimed that by making available “cached” copies of his 
copyrighted works, Google’s search service infringed upon his 
reproduction and distribution rights.83 But the court found, among other 
things, that Google’s uses were fair, in large part because its search engine 
served different and socially important purposes that failed to harm the 
copyright owner economically.84 
In another case involving Google around the same time period, the 
Ninth Circuit revisited some of the issues that had come up during the 
earlier Arriba case. Specifically, the plaintiff in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com 
argued that Google’s use of thumbnail versions of its copyrighted works, 
as well as its linking to and framing of full-sized versions of the works, 
infringed upon the copyright owner’s public display and distribution 
rights.85 At the district court level, Google lost on the thumbnail issue.86 
But Google appealed its loss to the Ninth Circuit. As in Arriba’s case, the 
Ninth Circuit ultimately deemed that the company’s display of thumbnail 
79. Id. at 816–17.
80. Id. at 817–22.
81. Jeweler & Yeh, supra note 77, at 2. 
82. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007). 
83. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
84. Id. at 1118–22. 
85. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). 
86. Id. at 1587.
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versions of copyrighted images in response to search queries constituted 
fair use.87 The Court also found that Google’s in-line linking and framing 
of the full-sized photos did not infringe upon any of the copyright holder’s 
rights.88 Thus, Google’s risky bets not only ultimately paid off in the 
billions of dollars,89 but also significantly helped shape copyright’s fair 
use doctrine as applied to developing technological environments.90 
Early-stage gaming companies have also helped shape the 
boundaries of the fair use defense through their risk-taking activities. In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, for instance, Accolade, an early-stage 
game developer, wished to make its games available for use on the Sega 
gaming console.91 But Sega required third-party game developers to sign 
a restrictive licensing agreement to do so.92 Instead of signing that 
agreement, Accolade reverse-engineered Sega’s technology to discover 
how to make its games compatible with Sega’s console.93 In so doing, the 
company necessarily copied the Sega console’s software, and Sega sued 
Accolade for copyright infringement.94 On the copyright infringement 
issue, Accolade lost at the district court level.95 But instead of caving in 
and signing the licensing requirement, the company appealed its loss.96 
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that Accolade’s use of Sega’s software 
constituted fair use, in an opinion that some have lauded as important 
foundational fair use case law.97 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, another gaming start-up, 
Connectix, similarly took on significant intellectual property risks in 
pursuing its innovative activities.98 The company developed emulation 
software that enabled Mac users to play Sony PlayStation games on their 
87. Id. at 1163–68.
88. Id. at 1161. 
89. Jillian D’Onfro, Here’s How Much You Would Have Made If You’d Invested in Google at 
Its IPO, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-ipo-how-much-
would-you-have-made-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/5BDB-SBGP] (discussing the rise of Google’s 
value). 
90. For more about fair use as applied to technological environments, see Edward Lee,
Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (2010). 
91. Sega Enter. Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 514 (9th Cir. 1992). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1514–15.
94. Id. at 1516.
95. Id. at 1517.
96. Sega Enter. Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
97. Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright
Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 
333–34 (2018). 
98. Sony Comput. Enter., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Mac hardware devices.99 In creating this emulation software, though, 
Connectix necessarily copied the PlayStation’s firmware in order to study 
and replicate its functionality.100 Sony ultimately sued and won at the 
district court level.101 The district court sided with Sony largely because 
it viewed Connectix’s emulation software as an economic substitute for 
Sony’s gaming console.102 But like Accolade, Connectix pressed on, 
appealing the decision.103 Again, the Ninth Circuit ultimately sided with 
Connectix, finding that its use of the copyrighted software constituted fair 
use.104 Among other bases for this decision, the court found that the 
emulation software was transformative and thus did not simply substitute 
for Sony’s products, even if it was commercially competitive with 
them.105 
Similar to Accolade, Connectix’s risk-taking activities thus resulted 
in a precedential fair use decision that helped adapt the fair use doctrine 
to an evolving technological landscape. And the company’s efforts 
undoubtedly helped shape the law beyond what a more risk-averse 
approach would have yielded. Indeed, rather than excessive contraction, 
some now worry that these types of decisions have rendered the fair use 
defense overly expansive.106 
The innovative, risk-taking efforts of early-stage companies have 
helped courts answer other important copyright-related questions as well. 
And unquestioningly, those risky exploits have pushed the boundaries of 
copyright laws beyond what pervasive risk-averse behavior would have. 
For instance, before Google acquired it, YouTube was another example 
of an early-stage company facing significant intellectual property related 
risk because of its video-sharing website. The site in its early days was 
notorious for hosting copyrighted content without explicit permission 
from copyright owners.107 The founders even seemed to encourage users 
99. Id. at 599.
100.  Id. at 601. 
101.  Id. at 601–02.  
102.  Sony Comput. Enter. Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1220 (N.D. Ca. 1999). 
103.  Sony Computer Enter., Inc., 203 F.3d at 602. 
104.  Id. at 602–08.  
105.  Id. at 606–07.  
106.  See Rebecca Cusey, Oracle v. Google: Expansive Fair Use Harms Creators, CPIP (Feb. 
23, 2017), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2017/02/23/oracle-v-google-expansive-fair-use-harms-creators/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6PM-B265] (arguing that fair use has expanded far beyond its purpose). 
 107.  Jeff Atwood, YouTube: The Big Copyright Lie, CODING HORROR (Oct. 7, 2007), 
https://blog.codinghorror.com/youtube-the-big-copyright-lie/ [https://perma.cc/D5MB-UPPF]. 
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to upload copyrighted content, in some cases posting such content to the 
site themselves.108 
The company’s saving grace turned out to be a provision in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that shielded website owners 
from liability if the site’s users, rather than the owners of the site itself, 
posted infringing content to the site.109 Of course, the DMCA’s safe 
harbor only applied so long as the site owners satisfied certain conditions, 
including lacking actual and so-called red-flag knowledge about 
infringing content on the site.110 At the time the YouTube founders took 
on these intellectual property risks, the meaning of these parts of the 
DMCA were still unclear, as courts had not yet interpreted them much.111 
Hence, YouTube could have been on the hook for significant liabilities, 
including remedies under both the DMCA and copyright law, if courts 
interpreted the DMCA and copyright law in a way unfavorable to them. 
Yet the possibility of winning big seems to have motivated the company 
to push forward in spite of those significant risks. And ultimately, their 
risk-taking proved lucrative—to the tune of billions of dollars—as courts 
interpreted the DMCA in the company’s favor.112 That risk-taking also 
helped shape the relevant copyright law and DMCA provisions in 
expansive ways.113 
Of course, the risks involved may have been one of the primary 
reasons behind why YouTube chose to sell itself to Google.114 Google had 
 108.  Ryan Lawler, Viacom: Google, YouTube Founders Willfully Ignored Infringement, 
GIGAOM (Mar. 18, 2010), https://gigaom.com/2010/03/18/viacom-google-youtube-founders-
willfully-ignored-infringement/ [https://perma.cc/NBL9-JV7E] (discussing these issues). 
 109.  For some discussion of the DMCA’s safe harbors and how they work, see Jeremy Malcolm, 
Time to Rethink Copyright Safe Harbors? 2017 in Review, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 30, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/12/time-rethink-copyright-safe-harbors-2017-review 
[https://perma.cc/T57L-4PJA]. 
 110.  See Mitchell Zimmerman, Safe Harbors Questions Answered DMCA, FENWICK & WEST 
(2017), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/DMCA-QA.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8MX-
YJVH] (providing an overview of the DMCA’s safe harbors). 
 111.  See, e.g., Mary E. Rasenberger, Viacom v. YouTube/Google: How Red Must a Red Flag 
Be?, CDAS (Dec. 22, 2011), https://cdas.com/viacom-v-youtubegoogle-how-red-must-a-red-flag-be/ 
[https://perma.cc/PD6T-9EFJ] (discussing the DMCA’s red flag provisions as an area of unsettled 
law as of 2011, well after YouTube had launched its video hosting service). 
 112.  YouTube Wins Case Against Viacom (Again), YOUTUBE BLOG (Apr. 18, 2013), 
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2013/04/youtube-wins-case-against-viacom-again.html 
[https://perma.cc/7FLN-2M62] (detailing YouTube’s legal victories). 
113.  Meaghan H. Kent & Martin L. Saad, DMCA Safe Harbor Upheld for YouTube Once Again 
in Viacom v. YouTube, VENABLE LLC (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2013/04/dmca-safe-harbor-upheld-for-youtube-
once-again-in [https://perma.cc/4HLB-DN67]. 
 114.  Victor Luckerson, A Decade Ago, Google Bought YouTube – And It Was the Best Tech 
Deal Ever, THE RINGER (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.theringer.com/2016/10/10/16042354/google-
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/3
2019] RISK TAKING AND RIGHTS BALANCING 893 
the resources to defend the site in court, whereas YouTube, on its own, 
would face greater obstacles on that front. Nonetheless, YouTube took on 
those risks, whether rationally, irrationally, or ignorantly, without any 
guarantee of Google arriving as its knight in shining armor. And in doing 
so, it set the stage for important case law relating to the DMCA’s meaning. 
Other entrepreneurial activity has helped expand the boundaries of 
copyright law’s first-sale doctrine. This doctrine exempts parties from 
copyright liability when they distribute copies of copyrighted materials 
that they own.115 For instance, the doctrine allows book owners to give 
away their copies of the books to others without infringing a copyright 
owner’s distribution right, and it allows used bookstores to further 
distribute copies of works they’ve lawfully obtained without liability. In 
a recent Supreme Court case, the Court found that the first-sale doctrine 
has no geographical limitations—once an authorized sale of a copy of a 
work is made anywhere in the world, the copyright owner no longer has 
an ability to stop further distributions of that particular copy.116 
This ruling’s genesis owes to the entrepreneurial activities of a 
California PhD student who decided to help fund his studies through 
economic arbitrage.117 The student, Supap Kirtsaeng, had his family and 
friends in Thailand purchase books there, where the books were priced 
relatively cheaply, and then ship them to him in California.118 Kirtsaeng 
then sold those books in the U.S. at the much higher U.S. prices, thereby 
making profits based on the price differences between the Thailand and 
U.S. versions of the books.119 In ruling that his purchase of the books in 
Thailand exhausted the copyright owner’s distribution rights, the Court 
not only validated Kirtsaeng’s risky venture, but also helped clarify the 
boundaries of copyright’s first-sale doctrine in a way that more risk-averse 
behavior would have never occasioned. 
Outside of copyright, early-stage companies have also pushed the 
boundaries of trademark law in pursuing their innovative activities. 
Similar to its effects on copyright, risk-averse licensing behavior can 
result in trademark entitlements expanding over time. For instance, one 
youtube-acquisition-10-years-tech-deals-69fdbe1c8a06 [https://perma.cc/J5UG-UH8L] (noting that 
some at the time of the acquisition believed Google was “crazy” to take on YouTube’s legal 
liabilities). 
 115.  For an overview of the doctrine, see Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 
EMORY L.J. 741 (2015). 
 116.  Clark D. Asay, Kirtsaeng and the First-Sale Doctrine’s Digital Problem, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
17 (2013) (discussing the case). 
117.  Id. 
118.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 527 (2013). 
119.  Id. 
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important form of trademark infringement occurs when consumers are 
confused that a third party’s use of a mark suggests that the trademark 
owner sponsors or approves of the use.120 In order to avoid a finding of 
infringement, risk-averse users frequently preemptively obtain licenses 
for their uses (or stop the use altogether), even when the law wouldn’t 
actually require them to do so if they were to fully litigate the issue.121 
Ultimately, as ever more parties seek out such licenses or stop using third-
party marks, consumers grow savvy to licensing practices and come to 
believe that licenses are the norm and even required.122 Hence, when an 
unlicensed use occurs, consumers are likely to believe that the use is, in 
fact, sponsored and licensed, resulting in consumer confusion.123 
Widespread, risk-averse licensing and lack of use therefore means that 
trademark rights have effectively grown. 
Despite these possibilities and even some evidence of this type of 
behavior occurring, other evidence also shows early-stage companies 
frequently taking on trademark-related risks in pursuit of technological 
innovation. Early search engines, discussed above in the copyright 
context, are also a good example of early-stage companies taking on 
significant trademark-related risks in helping shape certain trademark 
doctrines as applied to new technologies. Trademark owners brought 
claims against early search engines on a number of bases, including the 
search engines’ use of trademarks in generating advertising.124 But early 
search engine companies fought back, and largely prevailed in the courts, 
despite an increasing number of lawsuits as the industry exploded.125 
Hence, rather than caving to trademark-related risks, early search engine 
companies took those risks on. And in doing so, they helped shape 
important trademark doctrines as applied in new technological 
environments. 
Of course, not all risk-taking start-up companies are as fortunate as 
the ones discussed above. At the turn of the century, Napster and other 
peer-to-peer file sharing networks crashed and burned in several high-
 120.  About Trademark Infringement, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademark-infringement [https://perma.cc/QPL4-BFUJ] 
(discussing the basics of trademark infringement).  
 121.  See also Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty 
in Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211 (2014) (discussing “trademark 
bullies,” who use the high costs of litigation as one means by which to force third parties to stop using 
their trademarks). 
122.  Gibson, supra note 5. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Gasser, supra note 72, at 210. 
125.  Id. (reviewing this early history and the lawsuits during that period). 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/3
2019] RISK TAKING AND RIGHTS BALANCING 895 
profile copyright litigations.126 More recently, ReDigi, which sought to 
introduce an online marketplace for second-hand digital music, lost its bid 
to have copyright law’s first-sale doctrine apply in the digital space.127 
And in 2014, the Supreme Court found that Aereo, a start-up company 
that sought to allow its users to view over-the-air television programs on 
Internet-connected devices, impermissibly infringed on copyright 
owners’ public performance rights.128 These are only some of the many 
situations in which early-stage companies failed to overcome intellectual 
property related hurdles.129 
Yet despite their court losses, these early-stage companies provide 
further evidence of start-ups being willing to take on significant risks in 
pursuit of greater economic returns. It just so happens that unlike their 
more fortunate peers, they ended up losing their bid. But the point remains 
that start-up companies are not only important actors in helping push 
technological progress forward, but also in helping shape intellectual 
property doctrines as they take on risks that ultimately help determine the 
contours of those doctrines. Their risk-taking behavior thus helps push 
back against the more risk-averse, in some sense rational, behavior of 
many parties in response to intellectual property-related risks. 
Of course, it is impossible to say to what extent early-stage 
companies’ risky exploits balance intellectual property law doctrines. It 
may be the case that, overall, intellectual property entitlements continue 
to grow, in part due to the risk-averting behavior of other actors in the 
marketplace.130 Furthermore, as mentioned above, the evidence that I have 
highlighted is certainly anecdotal; it remains difficult to say how 
frequently early-stage companies embrace rather than shun risk. 
 126.  For background on these cases, see generally Bryan H. Choi, The Grokster Dead-End, 19 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393 (2006). 
 127.  Porter Wells, Capitol Records, Virgin Records Win Copyright Spat with ReDigi (1), 
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/capitol-records-virgin-
records-win-copyright-spat-with-redigi-1 [https://perma.cc/EJ8M-K56F]. 
 128.  For a summary, see Adam Liptak & Emily Steel, Aereo Loses at Supreme Court, in Victory 
for TV Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/26/business/media/supreme-court-rules-against-aereo-in-broadcasters-challenge.html 
[https://perma.cc/GRX9-7E29]. 
 129.  See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-
stifle-competition.html [https://perma.cc/62M4-AQD3] (discussing how increasing patent litigation 
may stifle many startup companies’ ability to compete and innovate). 
 130.  See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 723–24 (2004) 
(arguing that “trademarks [are] normatively stronger, broader, and ever easier to ‘protect’ for mark 
holders.”); See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising 
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721–25 (1999) (describing increases in actionable confusion within 
trademark law). 
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Nonetheless, the examples discussed above provide some evidence 
that the risk-taking behaviors of many early-stage companies provide an 
important check on intellectual property rights accretion. And if we 
believe that achieving balance in our intellectual property doctrines is an 
important goal, it seems prudent to ensure an environment that promotes 
the formation of early-stage companies willing to take on risks in pursuit 
of commercial opportunities. Part IV below provides some initial thoughts 
on how that might best be achieved. 
C. Late-Stage Companies 
Early-stage companies are not the only parties that take on 
intellectual property risks in the marketplace. Large incumbents may also 
seek out intellectual property risks in pursuit of greater economic returns. 
Consequently, they also help shape intellectual property laws and 
counterbalance the effects on intellectual property doctrines of more risk-
averse actors’ behavior. While large companies may not seek out such 
risks as frequently as early stage companies,131 situations do arise when 
they deem that the risks are worth taking. 
Large companies may be more prone to risk-aversion than early-
stage companies for a number of reasons. A primary reason is 
bureaucracy. As companies grow larger, they tend to add more teams (and 
mid-level managers to lead those teams) to address a host of issues, 
including marketing, legal, and regulatory questions.132 As one 
commentator put it, bureaucracy is the “necessary outcome of complex 
businesses operating in complex international and regulatory 
environments.”133 
But the resulting bureaucracy often makes building a consensus on 
decisions increasingly difficult.134 Quite often, the result is safe decisions 
 131.  See Brian K. Krumm, University Technology Transfer – Profits Centers or Black Holes: 
Moving Toward a More Productive University Innovation Ecosystem Policy, 14 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 171, 177 (2016) (discussing studies claiming that larger companies are typically more 
risk-averse and less innovative than smaller companies). 
 132.  Gary Hanel & Michele Zanini, The End of Bureaucracy, HARV. BUS. R. (Nov.–Dec. 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/11/the-end-of-bureaucracy [https://perma.cc/E4X9-T9V3]. 
133.  Id. 
 134.  For a discussion of how building consensus can slow innovation, see Maxwell Wessel, The 
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rather than bold, innovative ones.135 Hence, a form of excessive rationality 
often takes hold in large companies, meaning that daring forays into the 
unknown are frequently out of the question. Indeed, often a company’s 
bureaucracy grows up around an incumbent’s already proven products, 
and that bureaucracy focuses on squeezing as many profits as possible 
from those products, not pursuing bold new directions.136 Therefore, 
getting new ideas through the formal bureaucracy at a large corporation 
can often prove difficult, if not impossible.137 
Thus, in large companies, irrational, ignorant, or even rational risk-
taking is often less likely than in early-stage enterprises. Teams of lawyers 
and others work to identify and warn of risks, and multi-layered decision-
making processes ensure that large companies avoid the biases and other 
forms of irrationality (and even some forms of rationality) that may often 
propel early-stage companies to take on such risks.138 Of course, other 
types of biases often come into play—as discussed above, frequently 
those bureaucratic biases favor the status quo.139 And often the collective 
wisdom of a large company turns into its own form of irrationality, 
because even economically rational bets are shelved in favor of the calm 
waters of the current state of affairs.140 
Historically, commentators have often pointed to Microsoft as a 
prime example of this type of bureaucratic risk-aversion.141 The company 
has developed a number of innovative ideas and products over the years, 
 135.  Andrew Lark, How Bureaucracy Kills Creativity and Innovation at Big Companies, BUS. 
INSIDER (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/how-bureaucracy-kills-creativity-and-
innovation-at-big-companies-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/5TRQ-ER57]. 
 136.  Tendayi Viki, Why Large Companies Continue to Struggle With Innovation, FORBES (Nov. 
4, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tendayiviki/2018/11/04/why-large-companies-continue-to-
struggle-with-innovation/#3357a1a967b4 [https://perma.cc/B8AV-GJBU]. 
 137.  Morten T. Hansen & Julian Birkinshaw, The Innovation Value Chain, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(June 2007), https://kfsk.se/digilitt/wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2018/03/Innovation-value-chain.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JK2L-MLPA] (citing one executive as saying that “If I want to get a new idea to 
market quickly, I take personal control of it, and I steer it through the system. If I want to kill an idea, 
I send it through the formal process.”). 
 138.  Gary Hamel & Michele Zanini, What We Learned About Bureaucracy From 7,000 HBR 
Readers, HARV. BUS. R. (Aug. 10, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/08/what-we-learned-about-
bureaucracy-from-7000-hbr-readers [https://perma.cc/RM4T-4CN7]. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
 141.  Michael Clarke, The Risks of Risk Aversion, THE SCHOLARLY KITCHEN (Mar. 28, 2012), 
https://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2012/03/28/the-risks-of-risk-aversion/ [https://perma.cc/B8EY-
TC83] (discussing Microsoft as an example of a company that has squandered many economic 
opportunities due to risk aversion). 
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only to frequently shelf those ideas in favor of sticking to its bread-and-
butter: operating system software and the tools associated with it.142 
Large companies’ risk-averse tendencies can also be viewed in other 
ways. For example, large incumbents sometimes buy innovative start-ups 
mostly in order to thwart the competitive threat that they represent.143 
Hence, rather than taking the start-up companies’ ideas and building on 
them, the acquisition may often simply result in the termination of the 
start-up company’s product roadmap.144 And even in cases where large 
incumbents wish to utilize the acquired start-up’s products in their own 
innovative efforts, in many cases the incumbent’s bureaucracy and 
preexisting product roadmap end up stymying any additional development 
of the acquired technologies.145 The ultimate result is often less 
intellectual property risk taking as the incumbent firm sticks to its tried-
and-tested product roadmap. 
Overall, this risk-averse behavior of large companies is often 
associated with less innovative capacity.146 For instance, large companies 
often face greater difficulty in responding to changing market conditions 
or reacting as quickly as necessary to take advantage of a significant 
market opportunity.147 And they often overemphasize conservative 
financial concepts in making research and development decisions that 
tend to favor incremental innovations rather than groundbreaking, riskier 
ones.148 Indeed, in certain respects, large companies face greater 
intellectual property risks than smaller entities when they pursue new 
paths of innovation because of their vast resources. Large companies with 
significant revenues, after all, are often some of the more popular targets 
 142.  Kurt Eichenwald, Microsoft’s Lost Decade, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2012), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer 
[https://perma.cc/N77Z-P54V] (discussing Microsoft’s failure to innovate). 
 143.  American Tech Giants Are Making Life Tough for Startups, ECONOMIST (June 2, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-life-tough-for-
startups [https://perma.cc/VJ7C-N2JS]. 
144.  Id. 
 145.  Tony Greenberg, Save the Entrepreneur: Big Business Keeps Buying Startups, and Killing 
‘Em, TONY GREENBERG, https://www.tonygreenberg.com/save-entrepreneur-big-business-keeps-
buying-startups-killing-em-2/ [https://perma.cc/JK7K-KV6Q]. 
146.  Richard Cuthbertson et al., Kodak and Xerox: How High Risk Aversion Kills Companies, 
in INNOVATING IN A SERVICE-DRIVEN ECONOMY 166–179 (2015). 
 147.  See Martin Reeves & Mike Deimler, Adaptability: The New Competitive Advantage, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/07/adaptability-the-new-competitive-
advantage [https://perma.cc/RU65-UHBH]. 
 148.  Robert G. Cooper, Where Are All the Breakthrough New Products?: Using Portfolio 
Management to Boost Innovation, in 56 RESEARCH-TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 25 (2013). 
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for intellectual property lawsuits.149 Because of this risk, large companies 
often focus their efforts on incremental changes to their existing product 
lines rather than bold new initiatives. 
Because risk aversion tends to inhibit innovation, many large 
companies have sought to push back against their tendency to become 
increasingly risk-averse.150 For instance, many large companies have 
sought to structure themselves and their subsidiaries so as to enhance risk-
taking by avoiding the pitfalls of bureaucratic bloat.151 In some cases, 
large firms that have acquired smaller companies try to retain the smaller 
companies’ nimbleness by granting them significant autonomy in their 
operations.152 In other cases, firms build from the ground up semi-
autonomous units in an attempt to replicate a start-up company’s 
flexibility.153 Large companies also often bring in entrepreneurs and 
consultants to help them assess how the company can avoid its 
innovation-killing ways.154 Yet even in these types of scenarios, 
ultimately the large, bureaucratic mothership has significant say in what 
happens in the semi-autonomous units. And often that say has the same 
effect it has more generally—slowing down the company in its capacity 
to respond to every-changing market conditions, including its ability and 
willingness to take on significant intellectual property-related risks. 
D. Late-Stage Companies’ Effects on IP Law 
Despite these challenges to risk-taking, large companies do 
sometimes take on significant intellectual property-related risks. They 
appear to do so when they deem that the potential benefits outweigh the 
costs of the activity. Hence, large companies very rarely take on risks 
irrationally or ignorantly in the same way that early-stage companies 
sometimes do; the multiple checks in place at a large company simply 
 149.  Richard Lloyd, The Biggest US Patent Litigation Targets See a Big Drop Off in Cases in 
2016, IAM (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.iam-media.com/litigation/biggest-us-patent-litigation-
targets-see-big-drop-cases-2016 [https://perma.cc/8337-3BS5] (noting a drop-in patent litigation 
against large companies, while indicating that such companies are “typically among the most popular 
targets for licensing efforts”). 
 150.  For a recent book on how large firms can best become innovative, see GARY PISANO, 
CREATIVE CONSTRUCTION: THE DNA OF SUSTAINED INNOVATION (2019) (arguing that large 
companies must approach innovation differently than startup companies). 
 151.  Peter Lee, Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1453–55 
(2018). 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Beth Altringer, A New Model for Innovation in Big Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 
13, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/a-new-model-for-innovation-in-big-companies [https://perma.cc/
HFL4-ZQ8U]. 
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make such irrationality or ignorance less likely. Instead, their risk-taking 
is typically based on a rational cost-benefit analysis. Admittedly, winning 
the cost-benefit argument in favor of a risky proposition at a large 
company can be an uphill battle, for all the reasons discussed above. But 
it can and does happen. 
Again, Google presents a number of examples. The company 
officially left its early-stage phase in 2004, when it went public.155 Shortly 
thereafter in 2005, it made the risky decision to incorporate Sun 
Microsystem’s Java application programming interface (API) into its 
recently acquired Android operating system.156 Prior to that decision, it 
had negotiated with Sun about the possibility of using the API, but the two 
parties never successfully completed those negotiations.157 Google 
decided to use the API anyway, seemingly with the tacit approval of Sun’s 
executive leadership at the time.158 Despite this approval, internal 
documents at the time show that high-ranking Google employees believed 
that the company needed to license the API from Sun in order to legally 
use it.159 
Later, when Oracle acquired Sun, it also acquired rights to the Java 
API.160 It subsequently sued Google for its use of the API in 2010, and 
that litigation is ongoing at the time of this writing,161 with the Supreme 
Court recently announcing that it will hear the case.162 Nonetheless, 
Google is poised to lose the case unless the Supreme Court decides in its 
 155.  Lucinda Shen, If You Bought Google at Its IPO Price, Here’s How Much Richer You’d Be, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 18, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/08/18/google-ipo-price-investment/ 
[https://perma.cc/56ZJ-JVMF]. 
 156.  Stephen Shankland, Android, Java, and the Tech Behind Oracle v. Google (FAQ), CNET 
(Apr. 20, 2012), https://www.cnet.com/news/android-java-and-the-tech-behind-oracle-v-google-faq/ 
[https://perma.cc/5MPF-ESKF]. 
157.  Id. 
 158.  Jon Brodkin, Sun Wanted Up to $50 Million From Google for Java License, Schmidt Says, 
ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/04/sun-wanted-up-to-50-
million-from-google-for-java-license-schmidt-says/ [https://perma.cc/2A8L-Y9HL]. 
159.  Charles Arthur, Oracle Trial: Google Engineer Says Key Licensing Email Not About 
License, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2012/apr/20/oracle-google-trial-engineer-email [https://perma.cc/85MG-8YDP]. 
 160.  Aaron Ward, Google v. Oracle: Silicon Valley Braces for “Lawsuit of the Decade” as 
Google Petitions for Cert to Decide API Copyrightability, JOLT DIGEST (Mar. 13, 2019), 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/google-v-oracle-silicon-valley-braces-for-lawsuit-of-the-decade-
as-google-petitions-for-cert-to-decide-api- [https://perma.cc/W76A-SFGJ]. 
161.  Id. 
 162.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Google and Oracle Copyright Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/supreme-court-google-oracle.html 
[https://perma.cc/5HQQ-9C8P]. 
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favor.163 And losing the case may result in billions of dollars in 
damages.164 
Why would Google, in 2005 already a successful, growing company, 
choose to take on this intellectual property risk? Common narratives 
would not necessarily predict this outcome given Google’s size in 2005; 
by then, it already had nearly 6,000 employees and was set to expand even 
more in the years to come.165 Risk aversion arguably should have led the 
company to avoid the path it chose. Particularly because, according to 
Google executives at the time, paying a license fee for access to the Java 
API was well within the company’s ability.166 
But apparently the company believed that the benefits of its decision 
outweighed whatever risks it faced. One of the primary benefits was that 
programmers would not have to recreate the wheel in developing mobile 
applications for Google’s Android ecosystem.167 This was because 
programmers were accustomed to using the Java API in programming 
mobile applications.168 Google’s incorporation of the API into its Android 
operating system thus meant that programmers wishing to create mobile 
apps for Android would not have to learn a new set of APIs for creating 
those apps; they could rely on preexisting knowledge and use of the Java 
API in making their apps available through Google’s app store.169 Another 
benefit of declining a license was simply greater technological flexibility; 
at the time of license negotiations, Sun had requested of Google things 
that the company simply did not wish to do from a technological 
perspective.170 Hence, rather than take the conservative licensing 
approach, the company took on significant intellectual property risks in 
charting its own path. And in so doing, Google has set the stage for what 
some are calling the “lawsuit of the decade.”171 Time will tell whether the 
case ends up limiting or expanding copyright entitlements. 
Google’s Books project provides another example of the company 
taking on significant intellectual property risks in pursuit of innovative 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Google Facts and Figures (Massive Infographic), SOLARWINDS PINGDOM (Feb. 24, 2010), 
https://royal.pingdom.com/google-facts-and-figures-massive-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/C5HG-
P29T]. 
166.  Brodkin, supra note 158. 
 167.  Liam Tung, Google: Oracle Java Win Will Kill Software Development, So Supreme Court 
Must Rule, ZDNET (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-oracle-java-win-will-kill-
software-development-so-supreme-court-must-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6EQH-3G2R]. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. 
170.  Brodkin, supra note 158. 
171.  Ward, supra note 160. 
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new products. Among other things, as part of the project Google copied 
tens of millions of books and uploaded those digital copies into a large 
database that users can access through searches.172 While in most cases 
the Google Books product does not provide users with access to full-
length books, it does provide users with snippets of the copied books.173 
And aside from what users can do with the database, the fact remains that 
Google copied tens of millions of books without authorization from the 
relevant copyright owners, thereby committing copyright infringement on 
a massive scale unless some copyright limitation excused the company’s 
behavior.174 
Unsurprisingly, copyright holders soon came after Google for 
copyright infringement.175 Initially, the company sought to structure a 
settlement with as many impacted copyright owners as possible.176 This 
settlement would have allowed Google to proceed with the project while 
compensating some copyright holders.177 Because the settlement 
represented Google taking a license rather than fighting it out in court, it 
might be viewed as the kind of risk aversion, or at least prudent decision-
making, we typically associate with larger companies (and the type of 
behavior that may ultimately expand copyright entitlements). In fact, 
Professor Gibson points to this early settlement activity in support of his 
central thesis.178 
But ultimately, the relevant courts rejected the settlement agreements 
that Google and many of the impacted copyright owners had proposed.179 
Despite this rejection, Google pressed forward with its Google Books 
project, under the belief that its uses of the copyrighted works constituted 
a fair use of them.180 As discussed above, however, accurately predicting 
 172.  Tim Wu, What Ever Happened to Google Books?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-ever-happened-to-google-books 
[https://perma.cc/9FVW-DHQ3]. 
173.  Id. 
 174.  David Kravets, Fair Use Prevails as Supreme Court Rejects Google Books Copyright 
Case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 18, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/fair-use-prevails-
as-supreme-court-rejects-google-books-copyright-case/ [https://perma.cc/U9DC-Y8QD]. 
175.  Wu, supra note 172. 
176.  Andrew Albanese & Jim Milliot, Google Settlement Is Rejected, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY 
(Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/content-and-e-books/
article/46571-google-settlement-is-rejected.html [https://perma.cc/G2Y7-GZW9]. 
177.  Id. 
 178.  See James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 348 (2007) (discussing 
the Google Books project in the context of his thesis). 
179.  Albanese & Milliot, supra note 176. 
180.  Devin Coldewey, Supreme Court Affirms Google Books Scans of Copyrighted Works Are 
Fair Use, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 18, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/18/supreme-court-affirms-
google-books-scans-of-copyrighted-works-are-fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/FW56-TNR3]. 
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a fair use outcome can be challenging. Google thus faced significant risks 
that the copyright owners would win. Indeed, in some respects, the case 
did not look good for Google; the company had, after all, copied millions 
of books in their entirety without permission. Damages could and would 
be massive if they lost the case.181 But the company willingly took on the 
associated risks, presumably believing that the possible benefits of the 
project were worth the risks involved. And Google ultimately triumphed, 
with courts finding that the company’s copying of those millions of books 
and making snippets of them available via search requests constituted fair 
use.182 
Another important, early example of a relatively mature company 
taking on significant intellectual property risks occurred when Borland 
International decided to copy a competitor’s menu command hierarchy 
into its own software products.183 Lotus, the entrenched incumbent, was 
an early pioneer and leader in the spreadsheet software market.184 Its user 
base was vast and familiar with how to execute commands on its 
products.185 Borland wished to challenge Lotus’s product with its own 
offering.186 But the company realized that users may be reluctant to switch 
over to its product if they had to relearn a new method of interacting with 
a spreadsheet program.187 It would entail the same types of switching costs 
that word processing users would experience if they were to switch from 
Microsoft Word to some competitive product; those costs are often 
enough to dissuade users from switching at all.188 Knowing this, Borland 
replicated components of Lotus’s command hierarchy so that users 
wishing to adopt their competitive program would not face so many 
switching hurdles.189 
Lotus sued for copyright infringement, but Borland defended its 
action, arguing, among other things, that the menu hierarchy was not 
 181.  Alison Flood, US Authors Seek Damages in Google Books Copyright Row, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/07/authors-damages-google-book-
copyright [https://perma.cc/9RLV-PKV9]. 
182.  Coldewey, supra note 180. 
 183.  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer Programs, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2397 (1996). 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. 
188.  Nabila Amarsy, Switching Costs: 6 Ways to Lock Customers Into Your Ecosystem, 
STRATEGYZER (July 27, 2015), https://www.strategyzer.com/blog/posts/2015/7/27/switching-costs-
6-strategies-to-lock-customers-in-your-ecosystem [https://perma.cc/9SPW-CS5L]. 
189.  See authorities cited supra note 183. 
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copyrightable.190 Despite an initial setback at the district court, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ultimately agreed with Borland, 
holding that the menu hierarchy was an uncopyrightable method of 
operation excluded from protection under the Copyright Act.191 Borland, 
which was already a successful, public company at the time of the 
lawsuit,192 thus set significant intellectual property risks to the side in 
pursuing its innovative path, presumably because it deemed that the 
market opportunity was worth the risk. And in so doing, it helped establish 
important copyright standards as to the scope of copyright protection.193 
A final example of a large, bureaucratic company taking on 
significant intellectual property risks in pursuit of innovation is Amazon’s 
2011 decision to launch a music storage and streaming service without 
first securing the rights to do so.194 In 2011, Amazon, Apple, and Google 
were in a race to provide cloud-based music storage and streaming 
services to their customers.195 With its iTunes service, Apple had been the 
leader in online music consumption for some time.196 And at the time that 
Amazon launched its service, rumors swirled that Apple would soon 
introduce a cloud-based music storage and streaming service.197 Amazon 
aspired to challenge Apple’s dominant position, and one obvious way to 
do so was to beat it to the punch. Amazon thus made the somewhat risky 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Borland International, Inc. History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, http://
www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/borland-international-inc-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/S4W2-SV55]. 
193.  Lunney, supra note 182. 
 194.  Larry Dignan, Amazon Debuts Cloud Drive, Music Industry Whines: The Screen That Will 
End Up in Court, ZDNET (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-debuts-cloud-
drive-music-industry-whines-the-screen-that-will-end-up-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/V6R8-DP7T] 
(indicating that the music industry protested in response to Amazon’s launch of their cloud storage 
and streaming service because Amazon had failed to secure the rights to provide such a service); 
Miguel Helft, Apple Unveils ‘Cloud’ Music and Storage Service, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/technology/07apple.html [https://perma.cc/4UF2-EL8H] 
(indicating that Amazon and Google’s failure to secure licenses for their cloud streaming services 
meant that those companies could not offer as much functionality as Apple, which had secured 
licenses from the music copyright holders).  
195.  Chris Gayomali, Apple Beats Google in the Race to the Music Cloud, TIME (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://techland.time.com/2011/04/22/apple-beats-google-in-the-race-to-the-music-cloud/ 
[https://perma.cc/92CA-TDHU]. 
 196.  Kirk McElhearn, 15 Years of iTunes: A Look at Apple’s Media App and Its Influence on an 
Industry, MACWORLD (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.macworld.com/article/3019878/15-years-of-
itunes-a-look-at-apples-media-app-and-its-influence-on-an-industry.html [https://perma.cc/XN7Q-
C6F2]. 
 197.  Federico Viticci, Apple’s Cloud Music Service Almost Ready to Launch?, MACSTORIES 
(Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.macstories.net/news/apples-cloud-music-service-almost-ready-to-
launch/ [https://perma.cc/5JLJ-ABKJ]. 
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decision to launch its cloud storage and streaming service before it had 
negotiated those rights with the large music copyright holders.198 That 
decision upset those copyright holders, but apparently Amazon thought 
the benefits to be worth whatever risks it faced.199 
This last example shows several things. First, in some cases, large 
companies are in a better position to take on intellectual property risks 
than smaller, more nimble companies.200 In the case of Amazon, for 
instance, copyright holders are dependent on the company as a significant 
distribution mechanism for their copyrighted works; without Amazon, 
they will simply sell fewer copies of their works.201 Consequently, the 
company is better positioned to flout intellectual property risks because 
the rights holders will be loath to sue them for fear of upsetting the 
otherwise mutually beneficial relationship. Apple and Google are in a 
similar position to take on risks because their roles as primary distributors 
of copyrighted works provides them with significant leverage in their 
relationships with copyright owners.202 In cases of such mutual 
dependence, then, large companies may be particularly willing to take on 
intellectual property related risks simply because the parties’ relationships 
mean the risks are in some respects less severe. 
Second and related, despite large companies’ initial willingness to 
take on such risks, often they ultimately cave to licensing demands. A 
large company such as Amazon may be able to brazenly launch a service 
without first securing the rights contractually. But chances are that if they 
were to continue down that path without a license, rights owners would 
eventually pursue legal claims against them, in part because the 
unlicensed rights represent such a huge economic reward for them. Rather 
than risking a huge award against them, large companies like Amazon will 
instead often eventually secure contractual rights that cement the mutually 
198.  Gayomali, supra note 195. 
199.  Id. 
200.  Clark D. Asay, Copyright’s Technological Interdependencies, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 189 
(2015) (arguing that large tech companies have significant leverage vis-à-vis copyright holders, which 
leverage can result in such companies extracting from copyright holders’ rights that neither courts nor 
legislatures have been willing to provide). 
 201.  David Streitfeld, What Happens After Amazon’s Domination Is Complete? Its Bookstore 
Offers Clues, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/23/technology/amazon-domination-bookstore-books.html [https://perma.cc/SN4L-8EAQ]. 
 202.  Chaim Gartenberg, How Apple Makes Billions of Dollars Selling Services, THE VERGE 
(Mar. 20, 2019, 9:00), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/20/18273179/apple-icloud-itunes-app-
store-music-services-businesses [https://perma.cc/74QF-ABQ2] (detailing some of Apple’s success 
in licensing third-party copyrighted content to consumers through a suite of services). 
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beneficial relationship between the two sides.203 For instance, in the 
Amazon example described above, the company never went to court over 
the rights that its service potentially implicated. Instead, the company 
ultimately entered into contracts to formally secure the rights necessary 
for its service.204 
Importantly, the ultimate caving to licensing requirements can shape 
intellectual property doctrines in the worrisome ways that Professor 
Gibson has highlighted. Hence, though large companies are often willing 
to take on intellectual property risks initially, their propensity to 
ultimately succumb to licensing requirements represents the type of risk-
averse behavior that can and does result in intellectual property rights 
accretion. 
In sum, large companies, too, are sometimes willing risk takers. 
While a number of factors often push against large companies frequently 
taking on significant intellectual property risks, including a bureaucratic 
penchant for sticking to well-traveled roads, at times large companies do 
rationally pursue relatively risky initiatives in pursuit of significant 
economic returns. Indeed, in some cases a large company’s market power 
may make it more likely that the company will take on intellectual 
property risks because that power means that the risks are effectively 
negligible, at least initially. However, even in cases where large 
companies initially take on intellectual property risks, risk-aversion often 
ultimately wins out because the licensing route is simply the prudent thing 
to do. And when large companies reverse course in this way, that behavior 
undermines the very benefits that their risk-taking would have otherwise 
generated. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In the previous Part, I explored a number of scenarios where parties 
seek out risk rather than avoid it. In particular, early-stage companies and 
even later-stage companies are sometimes willing to take on significant 
intellectual property risks in pursuit of commercial opportunities. Early-
 203.  For one prominent illustration of this dynamic at play, compare a young YouTube’s 
business model, which did little to nothing to monitor and ferret out copyright infringement on the 
site, with a more mature YouTube, which has implemented an extensive Content ID system to help 
copyright owners identify and take down infringing content. See Jonathan Bailey, YouTube’s 
Copyright Insanity, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/
2019/01/10/youtubes-copyright-insanity/ [https://perma.cc/MB5G-WEUS]. 
 204.  Anna Nicolaou & Leslie Hook, Amazon Nears Launch for Music Streaming Service, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/bc735108-6bc8-11e6-ae5b-
a7cc5dd5a28c [https://perma.cc/CDX5-SSZH] (indicating that Amazon was set to enter into deals 
with record labels to launch its latest music streaming service). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/3
2019] RISK TAKING AND RIGHTS BALANCING 907 
stage companies may take risks on ignorantly, irrationally, or rationally, 
while later-stage companies typically only take on risks after careful and 
informed cost-benefit analyses. Collectively, their risk-taking activities 
help shape intellectual property law doctrines in ways that at least 
sometimes may counterbalance whatever pernicious effects on 
intellectual property law doctrines the risk-averse behavior of others 
entails. Overall, risk-taking seems to be a vital part of ensuring that our 
intellectual property doctrines develop in a balanced manner. 
Yet it may not always be the case that economic actors remain 
willing to take on intellectual property risks in pursuit of commercial 
opportunities. In general, ineffective government policies and other 
exogenous factors can make pursuing business opportunities simply too 
risky.205 More specifically, corporate structures and culture seem to play 
a significant role in influencing to what extent parties are willing to take 
on intellectual property risks.206 Indeed, while large incumbents such as 
Google may sometimes be willing to take on significant risks, to some 
extent that willingness owes to the company’s carefully groomed start-up 
identity as developed during its early days.207 
Furthermore, as briefly discussed above, large companies often 
ultimately capitulate to licensing requirements, even when they initially 
take on intellectual property risks. The Amazon music streaming service 
scenario discussed above is just one recent example. Such capitulations 
are certainly understandable from a large corporation’s point-of-view; in 
many cases, the costs of a court battle are simply more than what it would 
cost the company to negotiate a contract with the copyright holders. 
Furthermore, that contractual relationship can lead to additional 
permissions that the company finds useful in building out its businesses. 
Indeed, in many cases where large companies do initially take on 
intellectual property risks, the plan all along may be to ultimately enter 
into contractual arrangements with the copyright holders to obtain the 
necessary rights. 
In contrast, early-stage companies often critically depend on a 
favorable court ruling for the viability of their business models. A young 
 205.  Sophie Perryer, Top 5 Economic Risk Factors, WORLD FINANCE (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/top-5-economic-risk-factors [https://perma.cc/BS2L-U3EP]. 
 206.  Ian Waxman, Corporate Culture and its Impact on Risk Management, NAVIGATE (Nov. 4, 
2019), https://www.navigatecorp.com/corporate-culture-and-its-impact-on-risk-management/ 
[https://perma.cc/U6CZ-NUMT]. 
 207.  Dan Schawbel, How Big Companies Are Becoming Entrepreneurial, TECHCRUNCH (July 
29, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/07/29/how-big-companies-are-becoming-entrepreneurial/ 
[https://perma.cc/V3QS-TL7S] (discussing Google and others’ extensive efforts to maintain 
entrepreneurship within the company). 
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YouTube, for instance, simply lacked the resources to pay copyright 
holders to provide for the type of access and functionality that its service 
enabled; the company’s only chance was to risk things in court, and it took 
that chance with aplomb. A more mature YouTube, on the other hand, has 
dispensed with its youthful indiscretions, instead entering into detailed 
contractual relationships with large copyright owners to ensure the 
ongoing legitimacy and growth of its services.208 And while that decision 
may represent a mature YouTube’s most prudent course of action, it also 
deprives the courts of opportunities to address important intellectual 
property doctrines, in ways that help balance intellectual property 
protections overall. 
Hence, in this Part I suggest that ensuring a vibrant U.S. start-up 
sector is a key to encouraging the type of risk-taking that is most likely to 
help positively balance intellectual property doctrines. Of course, how to 
best promote the development and growth of early-stage companies is an 
enormous area of study.209 This Part cannot possibly answer that question, 
nor does it seek to. Instead, it briefly highlights a few intellectual property-
related questions that may fit into the larger puzzle. 
A. Facilitating Industry Disaggregation 
As industries become increasingly concentrated, that concentration 
can prevent early-stage companies from thriving.210 In the artificial 
intelligence industry, for instance, heavy consolidation has meant that 
start-up companies rarely, if ever, make it past their initial stages.211 
Instead, large incumbents frequently swoop in at very early stages of the 
companies’ development to gobble up their product roadmap and 
 208.  See Saba Hamedy, YouTube Has Paid $2 Billion to Rights Holders Through Content ID, 
MASHABLE (July 13, 2016), https://mashable.com/2016/07/13/youtube-content-id-piracy-update/ 
[https://perma.cc/VDF7-QU6S] (discussing how the relationship between copyright owners and 
YouTube has changed over the years into an alliance); Ben Sisario, Music World Bands Together 
Against YouTube, Seeking Change to Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/media/music-world-bands-together-against-youtube-
seeking-change-to-law.html [https://perma.cc/D6CW-BKT9] (discussing the music world banding 
together in part to renegotiate their licensing contracts due to concerns over unfair royalty rates). 
 209.  For a review of some of the relevant literature on this topic, see Mike W. Peng, How 
Entrepreneurs Create Wealth in Transition Economies, 15 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE 1 (2001); Maria Minniti, The Role of Government Policy on Entrepreneurial Activity: 
Productive, Unproductive, or Destructive, 32 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRACTICE 1 (2008). 
 210.  See Noah Smith, Big Tech Sets Up a ‘Kill Zone’ for Industry Upstarts, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
7, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-07/big-tech-sets-up-a-kill-zone-for-
industry-upstarts [https://perma.cc/V5C4-98QV] (describing how industry concentration can make it 
difficult for early-stage companies to succeed). 
211.  See Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1187 (2020). 
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/3
2019] RISK TAKING AND RIGHTS BALANCING 909 
engineering talent.212 And while that gobbling may enrich start-up 
founders, it may often prevent the type of risk-taking that is beneficial to 
the development of intellectual property doctrines and, ultimately, 
innovation. 
For instance, because large incumbents acquire AI start-ups so early 
in their lifecycles, often those start-ups have yet to fully develop or launch 
their own commercial products.213 This means that early-stage AI 
companies often avoid confronting significant intellectual property risks 
in court because those court battles typically arise around the commercial 
launch of a product or service. Industry consolidation can thus prevent 
early-stage companies from helping define key intellectual property 
doctrines in the courts. 
Furthermore, once large incumbents consume start-ups, the start-
ups’ product roadmaps are often subsumed within that of the larger 
company. And as discussed above, when that happens the riskier venture 
is often abandoned in favor of the safer, tried-and-true product roadmap 
of the larger company. Or even if the larger incumbent initially takes on 
significant intellectual property risks in pursuing the acquired company’s 
product roadmap, often it ultimately succumbs to a more risk-averse 
licensing path, for the reasons discussed above. 
Some scholars have argued that adequate intellectual property 
protections can help facilitate industry disaggregation, thereby helping 
smaller entities thrive. For instance, Professors Robert Merges and Ashish 
Arora argue that strong patent protections can help start-ups survive in the 
marketplace by enabling them to better protect their technological 
investments; that is, larger incumbents have greater difficulty 
appropriating the value of those technological achievements when 
adequate property rights are in place.214 The result may often be a more 
disaggregated supply chain for different technological products and 
services.215 Professor Jonathan Barnett has similarly argued that 
intellectual property protections can facilitate disaggregated supply 
chains, thereby aiding smaller entities in surviving the constant threat of 
larger incumbents swallowing them up.216 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 




215.  Id. 
 216.  Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
785 (2011). 
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Hence, one possible key to avoiding the type of market concentration 
that makes pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities—and, by extension, 
intellectual property risks—difficult may be, somewhat ironically, 
adequate intellectual property protections for entrepreneurs. This premise 
may seem somewhat counterintuitive because the risk-taking discussed 
above focuses primarily on situations where courts contracted rather than 
expanded intellectual property rights. Thus, it may seem somewhat 
inconsistent to say that ensuring adequate intellectual property protections 
is important to ensuring that start-up companies continue to take on 
intellectual property risks in ways that ultimately contract those rights. 
There are at least two responses to this. First, it is important to note 
that most scholars that have argued that adequate intellectual property 
protections are helpful to facilitating market disaggregation focus on 
patent rights.217 On the other hand, Gibson’s worry about negative 
feedback loops mostly focuses on copyright and trademark rights.218 It is 
thus important to properly distinguish between the different types of 
intellectual property rights—and the different roles each type plays—in 
analyzing these questions. 
Second and importantly, intellectual property risk taking that results 
in a better balance of intellectual property rights is perfectly consistent 
with the notion of adequate intellectual property rights. Arguably, the 
intellectual property balancing that risk-taking facilitates should not be 
aimed at doing away with intellectual property rights altogether, or even 
weakening them to such an extent that they are ineffective. Instead, the 
risk-taking activities of entrepreneurs provide courts with opportunities to 
address and develop important intellectual property questions in ways that 
risk-averse behavior will not occasion. In other words, part of the reason 
that the risk-taking activities of entrepreneurs are desirable is because they 
often result in opportunities for courts to address important intellectual 
property doctrines. In a risk-averse world, those opportunities simply 
won’t arise. Hence, ensuring adequate intellectual property protections for 
early-stage companies can certainly coexist with early-stage companies 
taking on significant intellectual property risks. Proper balances in 
intellectual property law, after all, are perhaps the most adequate form of 
intellectual property law. 
In sum, one possible key to avoiding excessive industry 
consolidation is to ensure adequate intellectual property protections. Of 
 217.  For an examination of copyright and its role in influencing the structure of copyright 
industries, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 389 (2013). 
218.  Gibson, supra note 5. 
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course, there are many other, perhaps more important determinants of 
industry consolidation than intellectual property protections, so the above 
should not be construed to suggest that intellectual property rights are the 
sole, or even primary, key to the industry consolidation question. But as 
others have discussed, those protections can help early-stage companies 
thrive, leading to product development and commercial launches rather 
than premature acquisitions and demises. And in so doing, they can also 
help early-stage companies take on intellectual property risks, thereby 
giving courts more opportunities to develop key intellectual property 
doctrines. 
B. Technological Consciousness 
In addressing intellectual property questions, courts often take into 
account how their decisions may affect technological innovation.219 In the 
context of copyright law’s fair use doctrine, for instance, courts are often 
particularly concerned with how their decisions intersect with the new 
technologies at play.220 Yet courts are not consistent in considering the 
technological ramifications of their decisions.221 Becoming more 
consistent—and being explicit that technological ramifications are an 
important part of the intellectual property rights calculus—would 
arguably embolden more start-ups to take on risks and thereby aid in the 
development of key intellectual property doctrines.222 
Consistency in this way would embolden more start-ups to take on 
intellectual property risks for a number of reasons. For instance, many 
start-ups’ business models focus on developing new technologies that 
make innovative uses of works subject to intellectual property protections. 
Many of the examples discussed above, including the VCR, YouTube, 
search engines, and others, fit this model. In many of these cases, the 
courts clearly took into account their decisions’ possible effects on the 
underlying technologies. Knowing that courts will at least consider the 
technological ramifications would likely boost entrepreneurs’ confidence 
that the court system will at least give them a fair shake. And knowing 
they’ll get that shake, more entrepreneurs are likely to take on intellectual 
property risks. 
219.  Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 402 (1968). 
220.  See generally Lee, supra note 90. 
221.  For an example where the majority and dissent failed to see eye-to-eye on technological 
ramifications of the decision, see American Broadcast Corporation, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 
(2014). 
 222.  For a specific proposal along these lines, see Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law 
Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65 (2016). 
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Yet other courts are not as explicit in their concern for the 
technological impacts, instead sticking to what they consider to be the task 
at hand: interpreting and applying intellectual property doctrines, without 
attention to what the technological ramifications may be. In a recent Ninth 
Circuit decision, for instance, former Judge Alex Kozinski appeared to 
take this approach. In that case, a woman had agreed to take part in a 
film.223 But when the film was released, its topic strayed widely from what 
she had been led to believe.224 She received death threats for her 
involvement and sought to have the film removed from YouTube and 
other online venues on the basis of a copyright interest she claimed in her 
five-second performance within the film.225 In an opinion that was 
eventually overturned en banc, Kozinski countenanced her copyright 
claim, interpreting copyright broadly in a way that ignored the possible 
technological (and other) impacts of the decision.226 That approach may 
be simpler in some respects, but arguably it is inconsistent with both 
Supreme Court case law and the constitutional clause authorizing 
Congress to enact patent and copyright laws. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed technological 
concerns when interpreting key intellectual property doctrines.227 The 
idea in at least some of those cases seems to be that, when possible, courts 
should interpret intellectual property doctrines in a way that avoids 
impeding technological progress.228 Hence, though copyright may not be 
solely focused on promoting technological progress, that is at least one of 
its goals. When applying intellectual property doctrines, lower courts 
should thus be conscious of how their decisions may impact technological 
progress, even if that progress is not the only thing they should consider. 
The U.S. Constitution bolsters this argument. The Constitution’s IP 
Clause empowers Congress to enact both patent and copyright laws to the 
end of “promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.”229 
Traditionally, scholars have identified the progress of science with 
copyright, and the progress of the useful arts with patent laws.230 Yet 
 223.  Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives and IP in Garcia v. Google and Beyond, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. 37 (2014). 
224.  Id. (summarizing the case). 
225.  Id. 
226.  Id. 
227.  See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005) 
(acknowledging “concern that imposing liability, not only on infringers but on distributors of software 
based on its potential for unlawful use, could limit further development of beneficial technologies.”). 
228.  Asay, supra note 211, at 88. 
229.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
230.  Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
421 (2009).  
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scholars have recently argued that such a clean separation of the two is 
not necessarily justified.231 Instead, the Constitution’s IP Clause justifies 
copyrights and patents on the basis of a broad, somewhat open-ended 
notion of progress in technological and creative fields.232 
Accordingly, when interpreting important intellectual property 
doctrines, courts should hark back to the Constitutional purpose behind 
many of these laws. And when they do so, how their decisions may affect 
technological developments is not only relevant, but, in many cases, 
arguably constitutionally required. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Risk aversion in the marketplace is pervasive. And it can result in all 
sorts of negative effects, including behavior that ultimately morphs 
intellectual property doctrines beyond their intended bounds. In short, 
pervasive risk-aversion can cause deleterious imbalances in our 
intellectual property regimes. 
But that is only part of the story. Risk taking can also be pervasive, 
and that risk-taking often helps shape key intellectual property doctrines. 
As discussed throughout this Article, frequently early-stage companies, 
and at times even later-stage incumbents, decide to throw caution to the 
wind in pursuit of commercial opportunities. When they do so, they help 
counterbalance at least some of the negative intellectual property law 
effects that more risk-averse actors perpetuate. 
Hence, encouraging early-stage companies in particular to take on 
intellectual property risks is important to helping ensure that our 
intellectual property system provides the benefits and balances that it is 
meant to achieve. In this Article, I have briefly explored some intellectual 
property-related means by which to help encourage early-stage companies 
to take on intellectual property risks. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. 
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